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Abstract. Achieving high dependability of Web Services (WSs) dynamically
composed from component WSs is an open problem. One of the main
difficulties here is due to the fact that the component WSs can and will be
upgraded online, which will affect the dependability of the composite WS. The
paper introduces the problem of component WS upgrade and proposes
solutions for dependable upgrading in which natural redundancy, formed by the
latest and the previous releases of a WS being kept operational, is used. The
paper describes how ‘confidence in correctness’ can be systematically used as a
measure of dependability of both the component and the composite WSs. We
discuss architectures for a composite WS in which the upgrade of the
component WS is managed by switching the composite WS from using the old
release of the component WS to using its newer release only when the
confidence is high enough, so that the composite service dependability will not
deteriorate as a result of the switch. The effectiveness of the proposed solutions
is assessed by simulation. We discuss the implications of the proposed
architectures, including ways of ‘publishing’ the confidence in WSs, in the
context of relevant standard technologies, such as WSDL, UDDI and SOAP.
1 Introduction
The Web Service architecture [1] is rapidly becoming the de facto standard
environment for achieving interoperability between different software applications
running on a variety of platforms. This architecture supports development and
deployment of open systems in which component discovery and system integration
can be postponed until the systems are executed. Individual components (i.e. Web
Services – WSs) advertise their services via a registry (typically developed using the
UDDI standard1) in which their descriptions, given in a standard XML-based
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language called Web Service Definition Language (WSDL2), can be looked up. After
a WS capable of delivering the required service has been found it can be used or even
dynamically integrated into a composite WS.
The WS architecture is in effect a further step in the evolution of the well-known
component-based system development with off-the-shelves (OTS) components. The
main advances enabling this architecture have been made by the standardisation of
the integration process (a set of interrelated standards such as SOAP, WSDL, UDDI,
etc.). WSs are the OTS components for which a standard way of advertising their
functionality has been widely adopted.
The problem of dealing with online system upgrades is well known and a number
of solutions have been proposed (see, for example [2]). The main reasons for
upgrading the systems are improving/adding functionality or correction of bugs. The
difficulties in dealing with upgrades of COTS components in a dependable way are
well recognised and a number of solutions have been proposed. The WS architecture
poses a new set of problems mainly caused by its openness and by the fact that the
component WSs are executed in different management domains and are outside of the
control of the composite WS. Moreover, switching such systems off or inflicting any
serious interruptions in the service they provide is not acceptable, so all upgrades
have to be dealt with seamlessly and online. One of the motivations for our work is
that ensuring and assessing dependability of complex WSs is complicated when any
component can be replaced online by a new one with unknown dependability
characteristics.
There is clearly a need to develop solutions making use of natural redundancy
which exists in such systems and guaranteeing that the overall dependability of the
composite system is improving rather than deteriorating. Note that the idea of using
the old and the new release of a program side by side to improve its dependability is
far from new: it was first mentioned by B. Randell in his work on recovery blocks in
which the earlier releases of the primary alternate are seen as a source of secondary
alternates [3].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
Web Service dependability and shows how it can be assessed using measures such as
“Confidence in WS Correctness”. In section 3 we introduce the problem of a
component WS upgrade. Section 4 discusses how keeping several releases of a
components WS available can affect the composite WS. In section 5 we provide a
brief description of the Bayesian inference and show how it can be applied in the
context of WS for assessing the confidence in their correctness. Some simulation
results are also presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed architectural
solutions. Finally, in section 6 we outline the on-going work on building a test harness
for managed WS upgrade together with several ways of ‘publishing’ the confidence in
a WS, compatible with relevant standards, such as WSDL, UDDI and SOAP.
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2 Web Services Dependability
The WS architecture is now extensively used in developing various critical
applications such as banking, auctions, internet shopping, hotel/car/flight/train
reservation and booking, e-business, e-science, business account management with
high dependability requirements, which in turn demand adequate mechanisms for
dependability assurance and dependability assessment in the new context of WSs [4],
[5]. In [1] the idea of ‘Service Management’ is advocated as a way of providing the
users of a WS with information about its dependability. Such a service is achieved via
a set of capabilities, such as monitoring, controlling, and reporting on the use of the
deployed WS.
Dependability of a computing system is the ability to deliver service that can be
justifiably trusted [6]. Dependability of the Web Services is a system property that
integrates several attributes the most important of which are availability, correctness
(reliability), responsiveness, and security. For many applications it would be desirable
if the service requester (consumer) could quantify these attributes by either assessing
them independently or relying for the assessment on a third party, e.g. a trusted
independent dependability broker or even the WS provider.
We recognise that security is a very important dependability attribute, especially in
the context of WSs. However, since the techniques for security assessment are still at
an embryonic stage, security is not addressed in this paper. Whether the ideas
presented here, e.g. confidence in security, are applicable to security, is to be seen
when security assessment techniques mature.
2.1 Web Services Failures
A system failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from its
specification.
A number of approaches has been used to analyse failures, their modes, effects and
causes in the context of Web Services [7], system software [8] and a computer system
as a whole [6], [9]. In this paper we focus on the following failure modes.
Transient failure – a failure triggered by transient conditions which can be
tolerated by using generic recovery techniques such as rollback and retry even if the
same code is used.
Non-transient failure – a deterministic failure. To tolerate such failure the diverse
redundancy should be used. Such redundancy naturally exists during WS upgrading
when the old (one or more) and new releases of the same WS are available.
Evident failure – a failure that needs no special means to be detected. It may be,
for example, an exception, denial of service or absence of response during a
predefined period of time.
Non-evident failure – a failure that can be detected only by using the existing
redundancy at the application level (e.g. in the form of diversity). It is clear, that the
non-evident failures can have more dramatic consequence than the evident failures.
This understanding of possible failure modes will be taken into account while
building dependable Web Services and affect the choice of the error detection
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mechanisms, fault-tolerance techniques, including the operating modes with several
WS releases available online.
2.2 Confidence in the Web Services
WSs, as any other complex software may contain faults which may manifest
themselves in operation. In many cases the consumers of the WSs may benefit from
knowing how confident they can be in the availability, responsiveness and correctness
of the information processing provided by the WSs. This issue may seem new in the
context of WSs but is not new for some well-established domains with high
dependability needs such as safety critical applications for which it is not unusual to
state dependability requirements in probabilistic terms, e.g. as probability of failure of
software on demand [10]. This fits nicely in the context of WSs, which can be seen as
successive invocations of the operations published by a WS. It may be very difficult
(or impossible) to guarantee that software behind a WS interface is flawless, but the
confidence of the consumers will, no doubt, be affected by knowing for how long the
service has been in operation and by how many failures have been observed.
Informally, I will be much more confident in the results I get from a piece of software
after I have seen it in operation for a long period of time without a failure than if I
have not seen it in operation at all. How long software has been used is no guarantee
that I will have high confidence in its dependability. Clearly, if I have seen it fail
many times in the past I will take with doubt the next result that I get from this piece
of software.
Building confidence measures to assess the correctness, the availability and the
responsiveness can be formalised. Bayesian inference [11] is a mathematically sound
way of expressing the confidence combining the knowledge about how good or poor
the service is prior to the deployment with the empirical evidence which becomes
available after deployment. A priori knowledge can be gained by the WS provider
using standard techniques for reliability assessment, e.g. the quality of the
development process or other techniques such as those described in [12].
The confidence in the dependability of the composite Web Service will be affected
by the confidence in the dependability of the component WSs it depends upon and by
the confidence in the dependability of the composition (the design of the composition
and its implementation, i.e. the “glue” code held in the composite WS itself). The
confidence naturally links two important aspects – the value of the dependability
attribute, e.g. probability of failure on demand, with the risk that the particular WS
delivers this attribute (e.g. its probability of failure is better than the specific value).
For instance, we may want to compare two WSs, A and B, for which the confidence
is expressed as follows:
- For WS A we have confidence 99% that its probability of failure on demand
(pfd) is lower than 10-3, 70% that the pfd is less than 10-4, etc.
- For WS B we have confidence 95% that its probability of failure on demand
(pfd) is lower than 10-3, 90% that the pfd is less than 10-4, etc.
Now which of the two WSs will be chosen depends on the dependability
requirements, i.e. the particular dependability context: A will be used if the targeted
pfd is 10-3, because the confidence that this target is satisfied with WS A is higher
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(99% vs. 95% with WS B). However, if a more stringent target is set, e.g. 10-4, then
WS B should be preferred to WS A, because the confidence that it meets the target is
higher (90% vs. 70% with WS A).
In the context of this paper focusing on managing the on-line upgrade of a
component WS the confidence is particularly relevant. The key idea behind an
upgrade managed on-line is that the composite WS does not switch to the newest
release of the component WS as soon as this new release becomes available since its
dependability may suffer as a result of the switch. The new release may provide better
functionality but it also brings in the increased risk that new faults may have arisen in
the new release which did not exist in the old release. A prudent policy of switching
would be for the composite WS to wait until it gains sufficiently high confidence that
the new release will not lead to deterioration of its dependability.
In section 5 we show how the Bayesian inference can be applied in the context
WS for calculating the confidence of a component and a composite WS.
3 The Web Service Upgrade Problem
A well-known problem for any component-based software development with OTS
components is the upgrade of the OTS components. When a new release of an OTS
component is made available the system integrator has two options:
1. Change their ‘integrated’ solution3 so that it can use the new release of the OTS
component. This may cause problems for the integrated solution and significant
effort to rectify.
2. Stick to the old version of the OTS component and take the risk to face the
consequences if the vendor of the OTS component ceases to support the old
releases of the OTS component.
Web-Service
1
URL: Node 1
Web-Service
2
URL: Node 2
WS1
WS2
Composite
Web-Service
URL: My Node
Composite
WS
All Web Services are published with their respective interfaces
according WSDL.
The  Composite Web Service uses Web Service 1 and
Web Service 2
Fig. 1. A UML Deployment diagram of a composite WS, Composite Web-Service, which
depends on two other component WSs provided by third parties, Web-Service 1 and Web-
Service 2, respectively.
The situation with a composite WS is very similar. Indeed, WS 1 and WS 2 in Fig.
1 are two component WSs used by a composite WS; conceptually this is equivalent to
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integrating any other OTS software component in an integrated solution. There may,
however, be a difference from the maintenance point of view between a composite
WS and an integrated solution in which OTS components are used. In the latter case,
as indicated above, the integrator has a choice whether to update the integrated
solution with every new release of the OTS components or not. Such a choice may
not exist in the former case of composite WSs. The deployment of a composite WS
assumes that the component WSs (Web-Service 1 and Web-Service 2 in our example
in Fig. 1) used by the composite WS have been deployed by their respective
providers. If the providers decide to bring down their WSs the composite WS may
become unavailable, too. What seems more interesting is that when the provider of a
component WS, on which the composite WS depends upon, decides to update their
WS the provider of the composite WS may not be even notified about the update. The
composite service may be affected without its provider being able to do anything to
prevent this from happening. Thus, the provider of the composite WS is automatically
locked-in by the very decision to depend on another WS.
Are there ways out of the lock-in? If not, can the provider of the composite WS do
something at least to make the consumers of the composite WS aware of the potential
problems as a result of the update(s) which are beyond their control? Below we
discuss two plausible alternatives.
3.1 Third-party Component WS Upgrade with Several Operational Releases
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 2. The choice of whether to switch to a new release
of a WS used by the composite WS is with the provider of the composite WS. They
may use whatever methods are available to them to assess the dependability of the
new release before deciding whether or not to move to the upgraded version(s) of the
used component WS.
The designer of the composite service may even make provisions at design stage
of the composite WS which facilitate the assessment of the new releases of the
services the composite service depends upon when these become available. An
example of such a design would be making it possible to run ‘back-to-back’ the old
and the new releases of the component WS used in the composite WS. During the
transitional period (i.e. after the new release, WS 1.1 in Fig. 2, becomes available) the
old version of the component WS will continue to be the version used by the
composite WS, but by comparing the responses coming from the old and the new
release, WS 1.0 and WS 1.1 respectively, the provider of the composite WS will gain
empirical evidence about how good the new release, WS 1.1, is. Once the composite
service gains sufficient confidence in WS 1.1 it may switch to using it and cease
using WS 1.0. Essentially, the composite service will have to run its own ‘testing
campaign’ against the new release of the WS and may use the old release as an
‘oracle’ in judging if WS 1.1 returns correct responses.
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Web-Service
1.0
URL: Node 1
Web-Service
2
URL: Node 2
WS
1.0
WS2
Composite
Web-Service
URL: My Node
Composite
WS
Web-Service
1.1
WS
1.1
Fig. 2. A new release, Web-Service1.1, of a component WS is released, but the old version,
Web-Service1.0, is also kept operational. The new release has no effect on the composite
service, Composite Web-Service, as long as it continues to use the old release, Web-
Service1.0, of the component WS. Eventually, the composite service is ‘upgraded’ to use the
newer version, Web-Service 1.1.
3.2 Third-party Component WS Upgrade with a Single Operational Release
Under this scenario Fig. 1 remains applicable: the most recent release of Web
Service 1 will be deployed behind the interface WS 1. The options left to the
provider of the composite WS are very limited. If the new release is at least
distinguishable from the previous release, e.g. the release carries the release number,
the provider of the composite WS will be able to detect the upgrade of the component
WS and try to ‘adjust’ the confidence in the quality of the composite WS which may
be caused by the upgrade and publish it to its consumers. A conservative view when
calculating the impact of the upgrade on the dependability of the composite WS
would be treating the upgraded component WS as if it were no better than the old
release, i.e. the confidence in its dependability is no higher than the confidence in the
old release as suggested in [12].
3.3 Own Component WS Upgrade with Several Operational Releases
In some cases a composite WS may use the component WS maintained by the same
vendor. In this case the upgraded component WS will be deployed in a way which
reflects the vendor’s view on whether the upgraded component WS may have
detrimental impact on the dependability of the own composite WSs which depends on
the upgraded component WS.
We expect that even in this case, when the vendor has access to the internal details
of the upgraded component WS, that prudence may dictate deployment of the new
release of the component WS side by side with the old release in a special
environment which has features for transparent upgrade including: interactive
features for monitoring the dependability of old and new versions (including typical
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adjudicator functionality for comparing their results), support for several modes of
operations (using the old release only, running the old and the new releases in parallel
and adjudication of their responses, switching to the new release only and phasing out
the old release from the composite WS) and a standard interface (i.e. using the WSDL
description of the component WS). The component WS provider should be able to
monitor the way the new release of the WS is operating and choose the best way of
ensuring the dependability of the service. The main difference between this form of
the upgrade and the upgrade of the third-party component WS is that here the extra
information that might be available about the component WS may affect the way the
dependability is measured. For instance, an extensive validation and verification (e.g.
regression testing and testing the bugs of the previous release on the new release or
the introduction of sophisticated mechanisms of fault-tolerance in the new release of
the component WS) prior to deployment may justify placing high confidence in the
dependability of the new release than has been achieved in the old release. This, in
theory, may justify the immediate switch of the composite WSs developed by the
same vendor to using the latest release of the component WS or at least configuring
the environment responsible to manage the upgrade in a way which will require a
very limited amount of operational evidence before the switch of the own composite
WSs to using the upgraded component WS can take place.
4 Solutions for Dependable WS Upgrading
In this section we describe several architectures which allow for a managed upgrade
of a WS. The architecture can be deployed as part of a composite WS in which the
WS in question is used as component WS or deployed by a dependability-conscious
consumer of the WS aware of the inevitable upgrade of the WS. The architecture can
also be deployed by the vendor of the WS if they want to provide high dependability
guarantees to the consumers of the WS. In either case the impact of the upgrade on
the consumers of the WS will be minimised.
4.1 General Architecture
The general architecture for a managed WS upgrade consists of:
− a specialised middleware which runs several releases of the WS. The middleware
intercepts the consumer requests coming through the WS interface, relays them to
all the releases and collects the responses from the releases. It is also responsible
for ‘publishing’ the confidence associated with the WS (or its releases);
− a subsystem which monitors the behaviour of the releases and assess their
dependability including confidence;
− a management subsystem which adjudicates the responses from the replicas and
returns an adjudicated response to the consumer of the WS. This subsystem is also
responsible for reconfiguration (switching the releases on or off), recovery of the
failed releases and for logging the information which may be needed for further
analysis.
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The architecture can be used to implement the forms of upgrade discussed above:
third-party WSs (Fig. 3, 4) and own component WSs (Fig. 5).
.
.
.
Monitoring
Tool
Management
Tool
Data Base
Web-Service 1.0
(Old)
WS Upgrating Environment
WSDL
WSDL
Upgrating Middleware
UDDI Registry
Web-Service 1.1
(New)
User (Service requester)
Requesting
process
Fig. 3. Architecture for managed upgrade of third-party WS deployed by the consumer of the
WS.
.
.
.MonitoringToolManagementTool
Data Base
Web-Service 1.0
(Old)
WS Upgrating Environment
User
(Service requester)
WSDL
WSDL
WSDL
Upgrating Middleware
Composite Web Service
UDDI Registry
Third-party
Web Services
Web-Service 1.1
(New)
Fig. 4. Architecture for managed upgrade of third-party WS deployed as a composite WS.
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.
.
.
Monitoring
Tool
Management
Tool
Data Base
Web-Service 1.0
(Old)
WS Upgrating Environment
User
(Service requester)
WSDL
WSDL
WSDL
Upgrating Middleware
Web Service 1
UDDI Registry
Web-Service 1.1
(New)
Fig. 5. Architecture for managed upgrade of a WS deployed by the vendor of the WS.
The architecture for managed upgrade of third-party WS can be deployed either as
part of the consumer of the WS (Fig. 3) or as a composite WS solely dedicated to the
management of the upgrade (Fig. 4). The architecture shown in Fig 5 which is
deployed by the WS provider and which makes the upgrade transparent for any
service subscriber is particularly relevant to practice since it allows for optimal
management of the upgrade based on full knowledge about the design and
implementation of the releases available to the vendor of the WS.
4.2 Operating Modes with Several WS Releases
There are some possible operating modes of the web services with several operational
releases:
1. Parallel execution for maximum reliability. All available releases of the WS are
executed concurrently and their responses are used by the middleware to produce
an adjudicated response to the consumer of the WS. Various adjudication
mechanisms can be used which range from tolerating evident failures only to
detecting and tolerating non-evident failures. In the latter case some form of self-
checking may be need which will allow to diagnose which of the releases has
produced a (non self-evidently) incorrect response before the adjudicated response
can be determined.
2. Parallel execution for maximum responsiveness. All available releases of the WS
are executed concurrently and the fastest non self-evidently incorrect response is
returned to the consumer of the service as an adjudicated response.
3. Parallel execution with dynamically changed reliability/responsiveness. It is a
generalised parallel execution mode. All available releases of the WS are executed
concurrently. The middleware may be configured to wait for up to a certain
number of responses to be collected from the deployed releases, but no longer than
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a pre-defined timeout. The actual responses collected are then adjudicated to
define the response returned to the consumer of the WS. The number of responses
and the timeout can be changed dynamically so that different configurations for the
adjudicated response can be defined.
4. Sequential execution for minimal server capacity. The releases of the WS are
executed sequentially (the order of execution can be chosen randomly or can be
predefined). The subsequent releases are only executed if the responses received
from the previous releases are evidently incorrect. A variation of this mode would
be to collect more than one non self-evidently incorrect responses and adjudicate
them using an appropriate rule.
4.3 Monitoring and Measurement
The monitoring subsystem conducts measurement of the dependability characteristics
including the confidence associated with them of the deployed releases of the WS,
compares their responses.
Every time the consumer invokes the WS this subsystem monitors the availability
(timeout can be used to detect if the service is down), execution time and the
correctness of the responses for each releases of the WS and stores these parameters
in a database. Detecting non-self-evident failures and diagnosing the release which
has returned a non self-evidently incorrect response is far from trivial and may affect
the correctness of calculating the confidence associated with the dependability
attributes since the confidence crucially depends on accurate records of the
success/failures of the observed responses, as described in section 5.1.
4.4 Management
The main functions of this subsystem are controlling several operational releases and
choosing the current operational mode, which is based on the dependability
assessment conducted by the monitoring subsystem. Adjudicating the responses
collected from the deployed releases and returning a response to the consumer of the
WS is also a responsibility of this subsystem. The adjudication mechanisms have
already been discussed together with the operating modes in section 4.2.
5 Assessment and Modelling
5.1 Bayesian Approach to Assessment of Confidence in Web-Service Attributes
In this section we illustrate how the Bayesian approach is normally applied to
assessing the confidence associated with a single dependability attribute, e.g. the
probability of failure on demand (pfd).
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If the system is treated as a black box, i.e. we can only distinguish between the
failures or successes (Fig. 6), the Bayesian assessment proceeds as follows.
Request 
WS 
Response 
Fig. 6. Black-box model of a WS. The internal structure of the WS is unknown. Only
correctness of the response (success or failure) is recorded on each request and used in the
inference of the WS’s pfd.
On every request the WS may succeed, i.e. return a correct response, or fail, i.e.
return an incorrect response or not return any response at all. The failure behaviour of
the WS is characterised by the probability of failure (pfd). Let us denote it as p. This
probability will vary between the environments in which the WS is used (i.e. the input
parameters provided by different consumers may differ or, if more than one operation
is published through its interface the frequency of the operations may change between
the consumers and over time). The various factors which affect the pfd may be
unknown with certainty, thus the value of pfd may be uncertain. This uncertainty is
captured by a (prior) probability distribution )(•pf , which characterises the
assessor’s knowledge about the system pfd prior to observing the WS in operation.
This distribution quantifies the assessor’s perception that some values of pfd are more
likely than some other values.
Assume further that the WS is subjected to n requests, a sample of demands drawn
in a ‘realistic’ operational environment (profile), and r failures are observed4.
Presented with the new evidence the assessor may change their a priori perception of
the system, i.e. the uncertainty about the pfd of the WS may change. Now it will be
represented by a posterior distribution, ),|( nrf p • , of p after the observations, which
is defined as:
)()|,(),|( xfxrnLnrxf pp ∝ , (1)
where )|,( xrnL  is the likelihood of observing r failures in n demands if the pfd were
exactly x, which in this case of independent demands is given by the binomial
distribution, rnr xx
r
n
xrnL −−





= )1()|,( .
(1) is the general form of the Bayes’s formula, applicable to any form of
likelihood and any prior distribution.
Now assume that the WS is implemented as shown in Fig. 5, i.e. two concurrent
releases of the WS see and process ‘independently’ a request from a consumer of the
WS. On each demand (request) there are 4 possible outcomes which can be observed,
given in Table 1 below. The four probabilities given in the last column of Table 1
sum to 1. For example, if the last three probabilities are 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively
than the first one will be 11p  = 1- (0.2 + 0.4 + 0.3) = 0.1. Even if these probabilities
are not known with certainty, i.e. they are treated as random variables, their sum will
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be always 1. Thus, a joint probability distribution of any three (out of the four listed
in Table 1) of these probabilities, e.g. ),,(
111001 ,, •••pppf , gives an exhaustive
description of the uncertainty associated with the failure behaviour of the system,
which in this cases consists of WS1.0 and WS1.1. In statistical terms, the model has
three degrees of freedom.
Table 1
Event WS 1.0 WS 1.1 Observed in n tests Probability
α Fails Fails r1 11p
β Fails Succeeds r2 10p
γ Succeeds Fails r3 01p
δ Succeeds Succeeds r4 00p
The probabilities that WS 1.0 will fail, let us denote it pA, and that WS 1.1 will fail,
pB, respectively, can be derived from the probabilities used in Table 1 as follows:
1110 pppA +=  and 1101 pppB += .
p11 represents the probability that both releases of the WS fail, hence the notation
pAB ≡ p11 captures well the intuitive meaning of the event it is assigned to.
Instead of using ),,(
110110 ,, •••pppf  we can use any other distribution, which can be
derived from it through functional transformation. In this section we will use
),,(,, •••ABBA pppf .
It can be shown that for a given observation (r1, r2, and r3 in N demands) the joint
posterior distribution, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf ABBA ppp ••• , can be calculated as:
∫∫∫
=
ABBA
ABBA
ABBA
ABBA
ppp
ABBAppp
ABBAppp
ppp
dxdydzppprrrNLzyxf
ppprrrNLzyxf
rrrNzyxf
,,
321,,
321,,
321,,
),,|,,,(),,(
),,|,,,(),,(
),,,|,,(
, (2)
where ),,|,,,( 321 ABBA ppprrrNL is the likelihood of the observation [13].
The posterior distribution, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf ABBA ppp ••• , represents the updated
uncertainty about the system failure behaviour consistent with the prior and the
observations. From this distribution one can derive the marginal uncertainties
associated with the probabilities of failure of each of the releases,
)|( nobservatiof
Ap • , )|( nobservatiof Bp •  and of the probability of coincident
failure of both releases, )|( nobservatiof
ABp • . For instance the distribution of the
probability of coincident failure, )|( nobservatiof
ABp • , can be derived from
),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf ABBA ppp •••  by integrating out the ‘nuisance parameters’ PA and PB:
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( ) ∫ ∫=
A B
BAABAB
P P
BAPPPP dPdPnrrrzyxfnrrrxf ),,,|,,(,,,| 321,,321 (3)
These can be used to calculate the confidence that the probability of coincident
failure is smaller than a given target. For instance, the probability that the probability
of coincident failure of the two releases is smaller than a given target, T, will be:
( ) ∫=≤
T
P
ABPAB
AB
AB
dPnobservatioxfTnobservatioPP )|(| (4)
Of course, if the system is treated as a black-box, as in Fig. 6, and the information
is ignored (or no detailed record is available) about the behaviour of the two releases,
WS1.0 and WS1.1, on the individual demands then the uncertainty about the system
pfd can be derived using (1). More specifically, the posterior will be (here we only
distinguish between r1 system failures, i.e. when both releases failed, and the case
when there is at least one release producing a correct response, n - r1):
∫
=
AB
AB
AB
AB
P
ABp
ABp
p
dxprnLxf
prnLxf
rnxf
)|,()(
)|,()(
),|(
1
1
1 ,
(5)
where )|,( 1 ABprnL  is the Binomial likelihood of the observation (n, r1) and )(xf ABp
is the prior distribution of the system pfd. Provided the uncertainty in both cases is
consistent, i.e. the marginal prior used in (5) can be derived from the joint prior
),,(,, •••ABBA pppf  by integrating out ‘nuisance’ parameters, PA and PB:
( )  =
A B
BAABAB
P P
BAPPPP dPdPzyxfxf ),,(,, (6)
we can even compare the results obtained with (4) and (6), i.e. the uncertainties in the
posterior system pfd calculated with the two models, the white-box and the black-box,
of the architecture of the managed WS upgrade. These two will generally differ,
except in the case of using a special prior such as the Dirichlet distribution [14],
which makes the two inferences identical, [13]. The fact that they are different is not
surprising – in the latter case we use a much more detailed observations than in the
former case. The ordering between the two posteriors cannot be known a priori: it is
possible that for a given target T the confidence derived with the black-box model is
worse than the confidence derived with the white-box model and vice-versa.
In the specific context of two releases of the web-service, WS1.0 and WS1.1,
instead of using the probability of coincident failure of the two channels one may be
interested in the probability of failure of one of the channels, e.g. of the new release
WS1.1, pB. Conceptually, it is the same as being interested in the probability of
coincident failure, pAB: first the joint posterior )|,,(,, nobservatiozyxf ABBA ppp  will
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have to be calculated and then the marginal probability, )|( nobservatiof
Bp • , derived
from it by integrating out the nuisance parameters, now PA and PAB:
( ) ∫ ∫=
A AB
BAABB
P P
ABAPPPP dPdPnobservatiozyxfnobservatioxf )|,,(| ,,
(7)
If WS1.1 is seen on its own, i.e. one ignores the fact that it is a descendent of
WS1.0, one can apply the black-box inference (1) to WS1.1.
Two important aspects of using the models in the context of Web-services are:
− first, the choice of the prior is important, as it is in any other context of using
Bayesian inference. Using a black-box model is simpler – it only requires a single
univariate distribution, )(xf
ABp or )(xf Bp , to be defined. The white-box inference
requires a trivariate distribution, ),,(,, •••ABBA pppf  to be specified. In both cases,
however, an assessor will face the same conceptual difficulty which comes from
the fact that WS1.0 and WS1.1 are two releases of the same service and, therefore,
the uncertainties about the probabilities of their failures must be assumed tightly
related. If the full model is used, in addition, the probability of joint failure must
be quantified and here assuming that the system is likely to fail whenever WS1.1
fails is a reasonable assumption. After all, if WS1.1 fails due to a unknown fault it
is very likely that this fault will also affect WS1.0, hence a coincident failure is
almost certain when WS1.1 fails due to such a fault.
− the model presented above is based on the assumption that oracles to judge the
responses of WS1.0 and WS1.1 are available. In practice, having a perfect oracle is
difficult, the oracles themselves may fail to judge correctly the responses of WS1.0
and WS1.1. Since the inference depends on the observations, incorrectly recorded
observations will affect the posterior confidence. In our particular setup we may
use WS1.0 as an oracle for WS1.1 where possible. Its detecting capabilities are
limited to detecting failures due to faults either newly introduced during the update
from WS1.0 to WS1.1 or due to creating circumstances in which faults present in
WS1.0 are masked, a phenomenon reported in [15], but will manifest themselves
in WS1.1 in which the masking code has been removed. If a demand is
encountered on which WS1.0 is known to fail the middleware of the managed
upgrade, Fig.5, may not relay the request to WS1.0, since the response will be a
failure. An alternative adjudication mechanism may be used in this case, possibly
with a limited detection capability, e.g. only checking for self-evident failures.
Despite these problems it is clear that the Bayesian inference can be used in order
to assess the confidence in the dependability of WS1.1 and even how it compares
with the confidence in the dependability of WS1.0. For instance, for any specific
dependability target, T, one can calculate the confidence associated with WS1.1 and
with WS1.0 that they meets this target, (4). Then the two confidences associated with
the target(s) of interest can be compared. If WS1.1 is no worse than WS1.0 (i.e. if it
provides higher confidence that the set of targets of interest) the middleware can
switch the consumers to using release WS1.1. If it turns out that WS1.1 is worse than
WS1.0, then the switching is not justified. More refined scenarios for the switch are
also possible, e.g. one specifies for WS1.1 an explicit dependability target (e.g. 99%
confidence that the pfd of WS1.1 is no worse than say 10-3) then switching to WS1.1
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will be justified even if the confidence that WS1.0 meets the same target is higher
than the achieved by WS1.1.
5.2 Simulation Modelling of the Dependable WS Upgrading
5.2.1 Model Description
An event-driven simulation model, executed in the MATLAB 6.0 environment,
was developed to analyse the effectiveness, both in terms of improved dependability
and performance, of the managed WS upgrade. Below we present the simulation
results obtained for running concurrently two releases of a WS. The middleware for
managed upgrade implements the following rules:
− a request from a consumer is forwarded to both releases;
− the middleware waits to collect responses from the releases, but no longer than a
predefined Timeout. The collected responses are adjudicated and the consumer of
the WS is presented with the adjudicated response. The implemented adjudication
rules are as follows:
- if all collected responses are evidently incorrect then the middleware raises an
exception (i.e. the adjudicated response itself is evidently incorrect);
- if all releases return the same response (correct or non-evidently incorrect) then
this response is returned to the consumer of the Web Service, too;
- if all the responses collected from the releases are valid (i.e. none is evidently
incorrect), then the middleware returns to the consumer of the Web service a
response, selected at random from the ones collected. Clearly, even if a correct
response exists among the collected ones a possibility still exists that the
consumer of the Web service gets an incorrect response, when the middleware
picks at random an incorrect response from those collected;
- if the TimeOut expires and a single valid response is collected this response is
returned to the consumer of the Web service, which may turn out to be non-
evidently incorrect.
- if no response has been collected the middleware returns a response ‘Web
Service unavailable’.
It takes each release some time (execution time) to respond to a request. The
execution times of the releases may be affected by various factors. The execution
time is modelled as a sum of two components as follows:
Ex. Time(Release(i))=T1+T2(i) (8)
where T1 – is the same for both releases and models the computational difficulty of
the demand, which is common for both releases, while T2(i) may differ for the two
replicas and may be due to differences between the releases. Both T1 and T2 are
simulated as exponentially distributed random variables, exp(T1Mean),
exp(T2Mean1) and exp(T2Mean2), respectively, with different parameters.
The overall execution time of the system with several operational releases of the
WS is calculated as:
Ex. time(WS) = min(TimeOut, max(Ex. time(Release(i)))+dT (9)
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where dT is the time taken by the middleware to adjudicate the release responses.
The behaviour of the releases is simulated under the assumption that a degree of
correlation between the types of responses exists which is modelled through a set of
conditional probabilities:
P(slower response is X | faster response is Y) (10)
Where the types of responses (X and Y) are:
- correct (CR);
- evident failure (ER);
- non-evident failure (NER).
A special case would be independence of the behaviour of the releases (i.e. the
type of response they returns on demand), which is included in our results for
reference, although it is clearly unrealistic.
5.2.2 Simulation Settings
Table 2. Marginal probabilities associated with the responses of the releases
Independent probabilities for different outcomes
Release 1 (Rel1) Release 2 (Rel2)Run
CR ER NER CR ER NER
1 0.70 0.15 0.15 0.70 0.15 0.15
2 0.70 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.20 0.20
3 0.70 0.15 0.15 0.50 0.25 0.25
4 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.30
Table 3. Conditional probabilities associated with the response from the slower release (10)
Probabilities: P(outcome Rel2 | outcome Rel1)Run Condition
CR ER NER
CR 0.90 0.05 0.05
ER 0.05 0.90 0.051
Outcome of
Release 1
NER 0.05 0.05 0.90
CR 0.80 0.10 0.10
ER 0.10 0.80 0.102
Outcome of
Release 1
NER 0.10 0.10 0.80
CR 0.70 0.15 0.15
ER 0.15 0.70 0.153
Outcome of
Release 1
NER 0.15 0.15 0.70
CR 0.40 0.30 0.30
ER 0.30 0.40 0.304
Outcome of
Release 1
NER 0.30 0.30 0.40
The execution times ware simulated with the following parameters:
- T1Mean=0.7 sec;
- T2Mean1 = T2Mean2=0.7 sec;
- dT=0.1 sec.
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5.2.3 Simulation Results
The simulation results – mean execution time and number of responses of different
types - are presented in Tables 4 and 5 obtained on 10,000 requests processed under
different regimes, as defined in section 5.2.2.
Table 4. Simulation results assuming positive correlation between release failures
TimeOut = 1.5 sec TimeOut = 2.0 sec TimeOut = 3.0 sec
Run Observations
Rel1 Rel2 System Rel1 Rel2 System Rel1 Rel2 System
MET5 1.0077 1.0054 1.2194 1.0077 1.0054 1.2290 1.0077 1.0054 1.2357
CR 6709 6230 6762 6785 6301 6815 6840 6348 6851
EER 1443 1668 1449 1460 1690 1470 1470 1706 1475
NER 1412 1664 1463 1428 1676 1472 1437 1686 1480
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9564 9562 9674 9673 9667 9757 9747 9740 9806
NRDT6 436 438 326 327 333 243 253 260 194
1
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
2 MET 0.9955 0.9912 1.2052 0.9955 0.9912 1.2148 0.9955 0.9912 1.2214
CR 6733 5706 6683 6819 5764 6755 6866 5802 6780
EER 1420 1944 1502 1436 1964 1506 1452 1982 1529
NER 1414 1941 1504 1434 1962 1514 1447 1983 1522
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9567 9591 9689 9689 9690 9775 9765 9767 9831
NRDT 433 409 311 311 310 225 235 233 169
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
MET 0.9870 0.9949 1.2153 0.9870 0.9949 1.2153 0.9870 0.9949 1.2213
CR 6777 5231 6661 6777 5231 6672 6823 5268 6702
EER 1438 2217 1530 1438 2217 1521 1449 2230 1526
NER 1492 2269 1611 1492 2269 1609 1503 2283 1618
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9707 9717 9802 9707 9717 9802 9775 9781 9846
NRDT 293 283 198 293 283 198 225 219 154
3
Total req. 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
MET 0.9966 0.9925 1.2097 0.9966 0.9925 1.2183 0.9966 0.9925 1.2246
CR 6744 3519 6395 6808 3559 6462 6845 3581 6491
EER 1434 3016 1635 1444 3042 1629 1457 3065 1631
NER 1436 3076 1679 1456 3106 1689 1467 3134 1705
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9614 9611 9709 9708 9707 9780 9769 9780 9827
NRDT 386 389 291 292 293 220 231 220 173
4
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
                                                          
5 MET – mean execution time, in sec.
6 NRDT – no response received within TimeOut
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Table 5. Simulation results assuming independence of release failures
TimeOut = 1.5 sec TimeOut = 2.0 sec TimeOut = 3.0 sec
Run Observations
Rel1 Rel2 System Rel1 Rel2 System Rel1 Rel2 System
MET 0.9995 0.9959 1.2095 0.9995 0.9959 1.2191 0.9995 0.9959 1.2267
CR 6729 6647 7759 6794 6709 7812 6852 6770 7853
EER 1406 1447 755 1424 1458 758 1432 1473 768
NER 1453 1481 1177 1471 1496 1194 1483 1514 1201
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9588 9575 9691 9689 9663 9764 9767 9757 9822
NRDT 412 425 309 311 337 236 233 243 178
1
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
MET 1.0086 1.0081 1.2239 1.0086 1.0081 1.2327 1.0086 1.0081 1.2386
CR 6730 5712 7396 6805 5780 7470 6856 5824 7509
EER 1428 1928 1021 1443 1947 1017 1454 1956 1013
NER 1424 1949 1286 1446 1971 1292 1455 1992 1309
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9582 9589 9703 9694 9698 9779 9765 9772 9831
NRDT 418 411 297 306 302 221 235 228 169
2
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
MET 0.9856 0.9894 1.2013 0.9856 0.9894 1.2107 0.9856 0.9894 1.2175
CR 6700 4816 6982 6775 4869 7039 6834 4904 7079
EER 1432 2400 1203 1446 2424 1226 1459 2445 1245
NER 1458 2378 1510 1471 2404 1515 1483 2436 1519
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9590 9594 9695 9692 9697 9780 9776 9785 9843
NRDT 410 406 305 308 303 220 224 215 157
3
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
MET 0.9884 0.9926 1.2031 0.9884 0.9926 1.2126 0.9884 0.9926 1.2193
CR 6687 3855 6624 6762 3887 6680 6813 3917 6704
EER 1419 2823 1416 1434 2865 1429 1444 2885 1444
NER 1484 2886 1656 1504 2928 1672 1518 2955 1687
O
ut
co
m
es
Total 9590 9564 9696 9700 9680 9781 9775 9757 9835
NRDT 410 436 304 300 320 219 225 243 165
4
Total requests 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
The simulation results can be summarised as follows:
1. The system availability offered by the architecture for managed upgrade is higher
than the availability of each of the versions. This is to be expected since the system
is a 1-out-of-2 system.
2. The mean execution time recorded for the system is greater than for the individual
releases. This is the price for the improved dependability assurance provided by
the fault-tolerant architecture – it waits for the second (i.e. slower) response before
adjudicating the responses. Some improvement can be achieved by returning to the
consumer the fastest response as soon it is received. dT is inherent for the chosen
architecture and cannot be eliminated.
3. Somewhat unexpected result form this simulation is the fact that when the releases
are assumed highly correlated (the first run in Table 4 with correlation between the
releases 0.9) the reliability of the system is higher than the reliability of either of
the two releases. When the correlation between the releases goes down (runs 2-4 in
Table 4 with correlation 0.8 – 0.4) the system reliability remains better than the
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less reliable release (normally the old release) but is now worse than the reliability
of the better release (normally the new release). This observation, true with respect
to all types of responses - correct and incorrect - may be due to the specific way
the correlation between the releases has been parameterised (Table 3). A more
detailed study with a wider variety of values and different combinations of the
conditional probabilities will provide further details about the interplay between
the properties of the individual releases and of the chosen architecture for managed
upgrade.
4. For the second set of simulation runs (Table 5) under the assumption that the
responses of the releases are independent, the system reliability is better than the
reliability of both releases. This observation is a good news – fault-tolerance
works. However, the result does not seem particularly useful because the
assumption of independence is implausible: after all the two releases are likely to
be very similar (significant portion of the code will be reused in the newer release).
Software faults present in the older release and not fixed in the newer release will
lead to identical failures.
The obtained results provide indications of the potential usefulness of the
architecture and of its limitation. Through extensive simulation one can identify the
range of possibilities which can be encountered in practice. The particular parameters
of a real life-system, e.g. which set of conditional probabilities describes best the
concrete system at hand, of course, is unknowable. However, the simulation results
may help in shaping the ‘prior’ for a Bayesian assessment of the chosen architecture
for managed upgrade, as described in section 5.1 above.
6 Implementation
6.1 Test harness
A test harness is under development for experimenting with the architecture for
managed upgrade of a third-party WS deployed as a composite WS (Fig. 4). It allows
the requests to the WS to be forwarded to the deployed releases of the WS
transparently to the consumers of the WS. When the responses from the releases are
collected the test harness adjudicates them and returns a response to the respective
consumer.
The test harness monitors the responses, using the calculated confidence in their
dependability and adjusts the adjudication accordingly. The consumers of the WS will
be offered a set of operations for changing the configuration of the test harness
according to their preferences:
− The users can add new or remove some of the old releases of the WS (add or
remove URI to the WSDL description of the WS releases)
− The users can specify the operational modes of the composite WS (serial or
concurrent execution of the deployed releases)
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− The users can explicitly specify the adjudication mechanism they would like
applied to their own requests to the WS (e.g. majority voter or other plans)
− The user can read back the confidence associated with each of the deployed
releases of the WS and calculated by the harness for different dependability
attributes (e.g. confidence in correctness, confidence in availability, etc.).
The test harness is being developed in Java using IBM WebSphere SDK for Web
Services7 (WSDK). Currently under development is the visual environment for the
managed upgrade of own and third-party WS, for which the Eclipse IDE8 will be
extended with a specialised plug-in, also under development.
6.2 ‘Publishing’ the Confidence in Dependability of Web Services
In this section we discuss some practical ways of ‘publishing’ the confidence (or
indeed any other dependability related measure) using the adopted standards for WSs.
The confidence is a probability and can be accurately represented by a floating point
number. To illustrate the idea of publishing the confidence let us consider a contrived
example of WS with the following fragment of its WSDL description:
<types>
<s:schema … >
<s:element name=”Operation1Request”>
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”param1” type=”s:int”>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”param2” type=”s:string”>
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
<s:element name=”Operation1Response”>
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”Op1Result” type=”s:string”>
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
…
</types>
In other words, the WS interface publishes an operation ”operation1” which
requires two parameters when invoked, ”param1” of type int and ”param2” of type
string, and returns a result ”Op1Result” of type string.9 Now assume that the WS
provider wishes to ‘publish’ the calculated confidence in the correctness of
”operation1”.
There are two ways of doing it:
                                                          
7 http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/wsdk/
8 www.eclipse.org
9 For the sake of brevity the fragments of the WSDL description related to messages, parts and
the service are not shown.
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− The response to a consumer invoking ”operation1” can be changed as follows:
<s:element name=”Operation1Response”>
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”Op1Result” type=”s:string”>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”Op1Conf” type=”s:double”>
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
− A new operation is defined which takes as a parameter the name of an operation
(for which the consumer seeks confidence) and returns the confidence in the
quality of the operation:
<s:element name=”OperationConfRequest”>
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”operation” type=”s:string”>
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
<s:element name=”OperationConfResponse”>
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”1”
name=”Op1Conf” type=”s:double”>
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
The advantage of the first implementation is that the confidence is associated with
every execution of ”operation1”. The obvious disadvantage is that the new WSDL
description is not backward compatible with the old one, which is not acceptable for
existing WS but may be OK for newly deployed services.
The advantage of the second solution is that the new WSDL is backward
compatible with the old WSDL. The disadvantage is that the confidence will have to
be extracted in a separate invocation of a different operation published by the service
(“OperationConf” in the example above), which may lead to complications.
Finally, a third option exists, which combines the advantages of both solutions
given above. It consists of defining a new operation, e.g. ”operation1Conf”, in which
the response is extended by a number providing the confidence in the correctness of
the operation. This approach allows the ‘confidence conscious’ consumers to switch
to using ”operation1Conf”, while it does not break the existing client applications
which can continue to use ”operation1”, i.e. backward compatibility is achieved.
The confidence will have to be updated when necessary (e.g. by the service
provider). The clients will be able to get this information directly from the UDDI
archive. Both the clients and the provider will be able to keep this up to date. This
will, for example, allow the clients to collect and publicise information about the
confidence in the service, which in many situations is the most appropriate way of
collecting information about confidence as only the clients know exactly if the service
provided is correct. However, an architectural solution in which the WSDL
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description of a WS is extended with an additional information reflecting confidence
in this service, as it was shown above, is more static.
Another possible solution, more structured and transparent, can use protocol
handlers on the service and client sides to transparently add/remove additional
information describing confidence to/from each XML message sent between the WS
and clients. The protocol handlers should be able to understand the additional
information in the same way on both sides. This architectural solution completely
separates the application functionality from dealing with the confidence-related issues
and ensures compatibility in that when there is no handler on the client side it keeps
functioning.
The Web Service architecture allows us to develop another solution, which
consists of a dedicated trusted confidence service functioning as a mediator for all
messages sent to and from the WS. This mediator can monitor all messages and
express the confidence in a convenient way, and example of such an intermediary is
given in section 4.1 (Fig. 4). The advantage of this solution is a complete separation
of confidence from the client and service functionality. Moreover it may be beneficial
to use such mediators as the trusted-third parties in the online negotiations between
clients and services. A disadvantage of this solution, clearly, is that the operational
‘evidence’ about how good the WS is will be generated by the traffic generated by the
consumers connected to the intermediary. In case that a significant traffic bypasses
the intermediary, i.e. many consumers interact directly with the WS, the confidence
reported by the intermediary may be out of date.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We have addressed various aspects of a dependable on-line upgrade of an WS. We
concentrated on the managed upgrade in which two releases of the service may be
deployed and discussed the implications of using a standard fault-tolerant architecture
in which the releases are used as ‘independent’ channels. We argued that the
confidence in dependability can be calculated and used to make a decision when to
switch the consumers of the WS from the old to the new release: when the confidence
in dependability of the new release becomes ‘sufficiently’ high. Through simulation
we confirmed that the managed upgrade can deliver some improvement compared
with of using either of the releases. Finally, we discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of various alternatives of deploying the managed upgrade: i) by the
consumers of the service, ii) by the provider or iii) by an independent broker.
Due to space limitation we could not address several practical aspects of
implementing the proposed managed upgrade. A few are discussed in this section,
while others will be covered in our future work.
One of the reasons for introducing the managed upgrade is the lack of notification
of the consumers when an WS is upgraded. Here we explicitly discuss various ways
for implementing such a notification. Such notification may be useful in the context
of the managed upgrade, e.g. if the managed upgrade is deployed by the consumers.
Receiving a notification may be used to initiate the managed upgrade from the old to
the new release. There are several degrees of notification and various ways of
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implementing it. One possibility is to use the existing registry mechanism and extend
the WSDL description of a WS to add a reference to a new release of a WS: this will
allow a consumer to detect this with both releases staying operational. Another
possibility is to use a WS notification service10 as a separate mechanism to inform all
the consumers of a WS about a new release. A similar approach would be to
explicitly notify the subscribers (consumers) using some form of “callback” function
to consumers of a WS.
Another problem with the proposed approach of using the confidence in the
dependability of the releases is defining a plausible ‘prior’ about the dependability of
the new release. It will be prudent to assume that the new release is no better than the
old release, but on the other hand, there are a range of scenarios in which such an
assumption may be implausible, i.e. the new release has seen a much more thorough
V&V than the old release ever saw. A related issue, which affects the accuracy of the
confidence in the dependability of the releases and the effectiveness of the managed
upgrade, is the perfection of the ‘oracles’ (adjudicators) of the responses from the
releases. We touched upon this problem in section 5.1, but the implications of using
imperfect oracles has not been assessed. This deserves extensive study, e.g. via
simulation, to assess how severe the problem, i.e. switch to the new release
prematurely, can be under a realistic level of oracles’ imperfection. More importantly,
such studies may allow for measures to be found which, if put in place, e.g.
implemented in the middleware of the managed upgrade, will reduce the problem to
an acceptable level.
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